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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
PORTER, Circuit Judge.  
 Donald DeLade claims that Pennsylvania State Trooper 
John Cargan violated his constitutional rights when Cargan 
caused him to be arrested and detained him based on fabricated 
evidence. DeLade asserted that his arrest and pretrial detention 
violated both the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court 
granted summary judgment to Cargan on the Fourth 
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Amendment claims.1 But on the Fourteenth Amendment claim, 
it declined to grant summary judgment or qualified immunity 
to Cargan.  
On appeal from the denial of qualified immunity, the 
question presented is whether DeLade’s claim of wrongful 
arrest and pretrial detention is cognizable under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We conclude 
that a claim alleging unlawful arrest and pretrial detention that 
occur prior to a detainee’s first appearance before a court 
sounds in the Fourth Amendment—and not the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For that reason, we will 
reverse the District Court’s order denying summary judgment. 
I 
 In September 2014, a sniper attacked two Pennsylvania 
State Troopers at the Blooming Grove Barracks, killing one 
and severely injuring the other. State Troopers immediately 
commenced a manhunt to find the sniper. The next day, State 
Troopers received a report that a man with a rifle was walking 
down a highway some fifteen miles from the Blooming Grove 
Barracks.  
Soon after receiving the report, State Troopers 
identified the man as DeLade. Cargan then ran DeLade’s name 
through a criminal-history database. The criminal-history 
search revealed that the sheriff’s department in Escambia 
County, Florida had issued an outstanding warrant for 
DeLade’s arrest. The warrant had a status of “no extradition,” 
 
1 The District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment to 
Cargan on DeLade’s Fourth Amendment claims is not at issue 
in this appeal. 
4 
 
meaning that the Escambia County Sheriff’s Department did 
not seek to extradite DeLade. Cargan, however, called the 
Escambia County Sheriff’s Department and requested that it 
change the extradition status of the warrant to “full 
extradition.” The sheriff’s department complied with Cargan’s 
request and changed the status of the warrant.  
Eventually, State Troopers found and arrested DeLade, 
who was still carrying his rifle. The Commonwealth charged 
DeLade under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9134 with arrest prior to 
requisition, alleging that he had been charged with a crime in 
Florida. DeLade remained in pretrial detention for five days 
awaiting his extradition hearing—his first appearance before a 
court. The sheriff’s department informed the Commonwealth 
that it would not extradite DeLade, so the Commonwealth 
dropped the arrest-prior-to-requisition charge against him.  
Before the dismissal of that charge, a second criminal 
complaint was filed against DeLade. In that complaint, the 
Commonwealth charged DeLade with being a prohibited 
person in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 6105(a)(1). DeLade then appeared at an arraignment 
hearing on this charge, and the court released him on bail. The 
Commonwealth later charged DeLade with disorderly conduct, 
in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5503. He eventually pleaded 
guilty to that charge, and a court sentenced him to twelve 
months’ probation.  
DeLade filed this lawsuit in the District Court under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that Cargan violated his rights under 
the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause by fabricating evidence to support the arrest-
prior-to-requisition charge. According to DeLade, Cargan 
fabricated evidence by calling the Escambia County Sheriff’s 
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Department and requesting that the outstanding warrant’s 
status be changed from “no extradition” to “full extradition.” 
The District Court granted summary judgment to Cargan on 
DeLade’s Fourth Amendment claims, finding that probable 
cause existed to justify charging DeLade as a prohibited person 
in possession of a firearm. But it declined to grant summary 
judgment or qualified immunity to Cargan on DeLade’s 
Fourteenth Amendment claim. Cargan timely appealed.  
II 
 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. The parties dispute whether we 
have appellate jurisdiction over the denial of qualified 
immunity under the collateral-order doctrine.2 “Under this 
doctrine, our review is plenary and ‘strictly limited to the legal 
questions involved.’” James v. N.J. State Police, 957 F.3d 165, 
167 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing In re Montgomery Cnty., 215 F.3d 
367, 372 (3d Cir. 2000)). But “[w]e lack jurisdiction to review 
the District Court’s determination that a factual dispute is 
genuine[.]” Id. (citation omitted). 
 This appeal concerns a purely legal question: whether 
DeLade’s claim of unlawful arrest and pretrial detention is 
cognizable under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. For that reason, we have appellate jurisdiction. 
See Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 
2017) (citing Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 549 n.4 (2007)). 
 
2 “[A] federal court always has jurisdiction to determine its 
jurisdiction.” Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 




 Qualified immunity shields a government official from 
liability unless the official’s conduct violated a constitutional 
right that is clearly established. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 
U.S. 223, 232 (2009). But in this case, we are presented with 
an antecedent question: whether the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides DeLade a viable vehicle for relief.  
More specifically, we must decide whether DeLade’s 
claim of unlawful arrest and pretrial detention against Cargan 
is cognizable under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as DeLade contends, or under the Fourth 
Amendment only. This distinction matters because of the 
more-specific-provision rule. Under that rule, “if a 
constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional 
provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim 
must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that 
specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due 
process.” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 
(1997); see also Wharton v. Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 246 (3d 
Cir. 2017). Simply put, if DeLade’s claim of unlawful arrest 
and pretrial detention sounds in the Fourth Amendment, then 
it cannot be asserted under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  
A 
 The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons[ ] . . . against unreasonable 
searches and seizures[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly said that “the general rule [is] that Fourth 
Amendment seizures are reasonable only if based on probable 
cause to believe that the individual has committed a crime.” 
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Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 192 (2013) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). The Supreme Court has 
also long held that a claim alleging unlawful pretrial detention 
falls under the umbrella of the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
 In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the Supreme 
Court observed that “[b]oth the standards and procedures for 
arrest and detention have been derived from the Fourth 
Amendment and its common-law antecedents.” Id. at 111 
(emphasis added). “These long-prevailing standards seek to 
safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences 
with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime.” Id. at 112 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). “Under th[ese standards,] . . . a policeman’s on-the-
scene assessment of probable cause provides legal justification 
for arresting a person suspected of crime, and for a brief period 
of detention to take the administrative steps incident to arrest.” 
Id. at 113–14. Thus, the Fourth Amendment is the provision in 
the Constitution that promises citizens “a fair and reliable 
determination of probable cause as a condition [of] any 
significant pretrial restraint of liberty.” Id. at 125.  
 The Supreme Court reaffirmed Gerstein in Albright v. 
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) (plurality opinion). In Albright, 
the Supreme Court had to decide whether “to recognize a 
substantive right under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to be free from criminal prosecution 
except upon probable cause.” Id. at 268. The Court declined to 
do so. Id. Instead, the Court held that “it is the Fourth 
Amendment, and not substantive due process, under which 
[the] petitioner[’s] . . . claim must be judged.” Id. at 271. In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that “[t]he 
Framers considered the matter of pretrial deprivations of 
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liberty and drafted the Fourth Amendment to address it.” Id. at 
274. And it recognized that “in the past [it had] noted the 
Fourth Amendment’s relevance to the deprivations of liberty 
that go hand in hand with criminal prosecutions.” Id. (citing 
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114).  
 All told, the Supreme Court has recognized the Fourth 
Amendment—and not the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment—as the appropriate provision of the 
Constitution under which to analyze allegations of unlawful 
arrest and pretrial restraint. See id. at 268–71; Gerstein, 420 
U.S. at 114, 125; see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 
388 (1989) (“This case requires us to decide what 
constitutional standard governs a free citizen’s claim that law 
enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of 
making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of his 
person. We hold that such claims are properly analyzed under 
the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard, 
rather than under a substantive due process standard.”).  
B 
 More recently, the Supreme Court came closer to 
addressing the precise question before us: whether a claim of 
unlawful arrest and pretrial detention sounds in the Fourth 
Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017), 
“[t]he primary question . . . [was] whether [a detainee] may 
bring a claim based on the Fourth Amendment to contest the 
legality of his pretrial confinement.” Id. at 914. The Supreme 
Court reiterated that “[t]he Fourth Amendment[ ] . . . 
establishes the standards and procedures governing pretrial 
detention.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
“And those constitutional protections apply even after the start 
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of ‘legal process’ in a criminal case—[in that case,] . . . after 
the judge’s determination of probable cause.” Id. (emphasis 
added). In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court noted 
that, when a probable-cause determination depends on false 
statements or fabricated evidence, that reality “cannot 
extinguish the detainee’s Fourth Amendment claim—or 
somehow[ ] . . . convert that claim into one founded on the 
[Fourteenth Amendment’s] Due Process Clause.” Id. at 919 
(emphasis added). In the end, the Court held that “[i]f the 
complaint is that a form of legal process resulted in pretrial 
detention unsupported by probable cause, then the right 
allegedly infringed lies in the Fourth Amendment.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 After the Supreme Court decided Manuel, we 
recognized that Manuel stands for the proposition that “the 
Fourth Amendment governs a claim for unlawful pretrial 
detention even beyond the start of legal process.” Geness v. 
Cox, 902 F.3d 344, 355 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Manuel, 137 
S. Ct. at 920) (alterations omitted). The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agrees. “Manuel [ ] makes 
clear that the Fourth Amendment, not the [Fourteenth 
Amendment’s] Due Process Clause, governs a claim for 
wrongful pretrial detention.” Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 
F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added). 
C 
 To date, we have not delineated when a claim of 
unlawful pretrial detention stops implicating the Fourth 
Amendment and begins to fall under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Compare Black v. Montgomery 
Cnty., 835 F.3d 358, 371 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding “that an 
acquitted criminal defendant may have a stand-alone 
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fabricated evidence claim against state actors under the [D]ue 
[P]rocess [C]lause of the Fourteenth Amendment” (emphasis 
added)), and Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 294 (3d Cir. 
2014) (holding that “if a defendant has been convicted at a trial 
at which the prosecution has used fabricated evidence, the 
defendant has a stand-alone claim . . . based on the [Due 
Process Clause of the] Fourteenth Amendment” (emphasis 
added)), with Davenport v. Borough of Homestead, 870 F.3d 
273, 279 (3d Cir. 2017) (“The Supreme Court has instructed 
that all claims that law enforcement officers have used 
excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, 
investigatory stop, or other seizure of a free citizen should be 
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its reasonableness 
standard, rather than under a substantive due process 
approach.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
This case requires us to address the question more directly. We 
conclude that the Fourth Amendment always governs claims 
of unlawful arrest and pretrial detention when that detention 
occurs before the detainee’s first appearance before a court. 
 Our conclusion is compelled by Manuel—even by one 
of the dissenting opinions. Although Justice Alito, joined by 
Justice Thomas,3 dissented in Manuel, they “agree[d] with the 
Court’s holding up to a point: The protection provided by the 
Fourth Amendment continues to apply after the start of legal 
process, if legal process is understood to mean the issuance of 
an arrest warrant or . . . an initial appearance under federal 
law.” Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 923 (Alito, J., dissenting) (internal 
 
3 Justice Thomas wrote his own dissent in Manuel, but he 
noted that he “join[ed] Justice Alito’s opinion in full.” 




quotation marks and citations omitted). So the Supreme Court 
in Manuel unanimously agreed that the Fourth Amendment 
covers a detainee’s arrest and pretrial detention at least through 
his initial appearance before a court. Compare id. at 919–20, 
with id. at 923 (Alito, J., dissenting).4  
 What’s more, our rule tracks the original public 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. We find persuasive then-
Judge Gorsuch’s discussion of the Fourth Amendment’s 
original understanding in Cordova v. City of Albuquerque, 816 
F.3d 645 (10th Cir. 2016). In a concurring opinion, then-Judge 
Gorsuch observed that “textually the relevant language of the 
[Fourth] Amendment speaks to ‘unreasonable searches and 
seizures.’” Id. at 662 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). And he noted 
that “the [Fourth] Amendment as originally understood 
focused on restraining police action before the invocation of 
judicial processes.” Id. (citing Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering 
the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 547, 609–
11 (1999)); see also Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth 
Amendment, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1181, 1298–1308 (2016). 
 For these reasons, we hold that the Fourth Amendment 
always governs claims of unlawful arrest and pretrial detention 
when that detention occurs prior to the detainee’s first 
appearance before a court. 
D 
 
4 We recognize that claims of unlawful pretrial detention may 
concern restraint after a criminal detainee’s initial appearance 
before a court. But because such a claim is not before us, we 
will not address it here.  
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 We now consider whether DeLade’s claim of unlawful 
arrest and pretrial detention is cognizable under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is not. 
DeLade claims that Cargan violated his constitutional rights by 
causing him to be arrested and detained based on fabricated 
evidence—the changed status of the extradition warrant. And 
DeLade alleges that Cargan’s conduct caused his pretrial 
confinement until his extradition hearing, when the 
Commonwealth dropped the arrest-prior-to-requisition charge.  
As we have explained, all claims of unlawful arrest and 
pretrial detention occurring before a detainee’s initial 
appearance fall under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, 
DeLade’s claim sounds in the Fourth Amendment but not in 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
* * * 
 DeLade’s claim of unlawful arrest and pretrial detention 
is not cognizable under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. We will reverse the District Court’s 
denial of qualified immunity and remand this case with 
instructions to enter summary judgment in Cargan’s favor.  
